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ABSTRACT 
The Philadelphia metropolitan region is the fifth most populated metropolitan region in 
the United States. One method of providing homeland security services involves the use 
of regional response networks to achieve the capacity required to respond to terrorist 
incidents. The Philadelphia metropolitan region presents a challenge of coordination 
because there are two FEMA regions, two state borders, two state offices of emergency 
management, eight county emergency management offices, and 317 local government 
emergency management coordinators involved.  
This thesis examines three regional networks to identify the features of successful 
regional arrangements. The research includes the assessment of leadership, structure, and 
regional performance to identify features that can serve as recommendations for the 
Philadelphia Metropolitan Region. The research reviews the impact of the current state of 
federalism on regional networks and identifies one system—the Metropolitan Planning 
Organization—that serves shared federal, state, and local functions within regions. 
Recommendations center on creating a regional integrative network that utilizes existing 
fire service capacity to deliver functional homeland security. 
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The fire service is one of the oldest public services provided by local government 
in the United States, first documented in 1736 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As an 
enterprise, the fire service has evolved from a single-purpose service focused on 
controlling fires to a multidimensional response element responsible for pre-hospital 
medical care, fire control, terrorism response, hazardous materials response, weather 
emergencies, and accidental disasters. Response to terrorism, the focus of this thesis, is a 
relatively new function that has emerged in the past 15 years. Starting in 1997, the 
Department of Justice initiated training programs aimed at preparing local fire service 
first responders to respond to terrorist acts.  
The current fire service response system does not support scalable deployment or 
seamless on-scene integration, nor does it make use of excess regional fire service 
capacity. The problem starts with local deployment models that focus on structural 
firefighting only, instead of integrating emerging needs associated with natural disasters 
and terrorism. Since 1977, structural fires have declined 56 percent in the United States, 
while fire service deployment schemes remain relatively unchanged during the same 
period (National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], 2011b). In addition, emergencies 
caused by the deterioration of aging infrastructure and ongoing natural disasters require 
fire services to advance thinking beyond traditions that no longer serve a broader public 
safety purpose. The complexity of terrorist incidents requires a regional response system 
that uses existing resources as a cohesive team.  
The new field of homeland security, as an additional mission requirement for 
emergency management and public safety enterprises, has passed its tenth anniversary. 
With this milestone, fire service organizations have an opportunity to address constraints 
such as limitations of leadership that keep us from building robust regional networks. 
How we frame our response to the reluctance to embrace a regional fire service model is 
important, and treating outlying factors/problems that evade correction will be necessary 
to build into any subsequent enterprise. Effective leadership is at the center of examples 
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of interconnected fire service systems that continue to evolve in the United States. The 
homeland security enterprise continues to face challenges related to coordination and the 
integration of response elements. The GAO reported:  
The American governance system, divided into federal, state, and local 
jurisdictions, does not provide a natural vehicle for addressing public 
policy issues from a regional, multijurisdictional perspective. The 
autonomy of local jurisdictions and competing priorities within and among 
them can make regional coordination difficult. (United States Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2004) 
No one agency can perform all of the simultaneous tasks required to assert control over a 
terrorist attack. The same claim applies to natural disasters, as was painfully reinforced 
during hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
The effort to evolve a professional planning capability for homeland security is 
problematic at this stage, and this deficiency negatively affects strategic decisions, 
enterprise readiness, and operational capability. Lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita indicated the need to correct the “weakness of our regional planning and 
coordination structures” (Townsend, 2006). However, the Philadelphia Metropolitan 
Planning Organization is an example of an effective regional network. This organization 
effectively facilitates regional transportation projects on behalf of federal, state, and local 
governments.  
Another ongoing dilemma is the need for regional plans to include addressing the 
need for sufficient response capacity and the basic plans required to coordinate these 
resources when they assemble. Findings from the federal TOPOFF (Top Officials) 
exercises verify that inadequate plans limit first-responder capability (CRS, 2008). 
Recommendations for solving this weakness include using creative methods to develop 
adequate capacity to meet incident requirements. In this regard, the federal government is 
encouraged to facilitate regional planning in order to develop potential solutions. 
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Research Question(s) 
The following questions will be addressed in this thesis:  
1. Given a recognized deficiency in organizational structures, what network 
approach would assist the fire service in the Philadelphia region in 
providing an integrated response to a homeland security incident? 
2. How does federalism affect the regional integration of fire services, and 
how do we address the tension that results from not having a functional 
network that coordinates federal, state, and local government activities?  
This project was developed on the basis of finding an appropriate methodology 
and resources to address the questions above.  The following sections provide the 
substance of that work. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this literature review is to assess sources relevant to the delivery 
of fire department first-responder services, inclusive of both their traditional services and 
the new responsibilities that address terrorist events. The federal government continues to 
develop and issue criteria to address expectations and improve homeland security 
coordination. The existing literature argues that the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) do not have processes 
to measure public-safety capability in light of the funding expended for these purposes. A 
review of sources, including Government Accountability Office reports, Congressional 
Research Service reports, panel presentations, congressional testimony, working papers, 
policy papers, after-action reports, and scholarly studies provided the context for the 
analysis.  
Approximately 30,000 fire departments protect the United States. Those 
departments are delineated into four types: all volunteer (70 percent), mostly volunteer 
(16 percent), mostly career (6 percent), and all career (8 percent). In relation to their 
protection of the population, the all-career and mostly-career departments protect 63.7 
percent of the population, and the mostly volunteer and all-volunteer departments protect 
36.3 percent of the population (NFPA, 2011a). 
The Analysis and Research division of the National Fire Protection Association 
prepared needs assessments of the U.S. fire service in 2001, 2005, and again in 2010 
(NFPA, 2011a). The reports conclude that 65 percent of all fire departments responsible 
for hazardous-materials response have not formally trained all their personnel. Notably, 
10 years after 9/11, fire departments charged with responding to incidents involving 
chemical/biological agents with injuries confirm that over 80 percent of departments still 
cannot handle such an event with local specialized equipment alone—the same result that 
was reported in 2001 and 2005. The results of this assessment are cause for concern since  
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DHS has made it a strategic priority to strengthen response capacity nationwide and a 
funding priority within the State Homeland Security Grant Program to fund CBRNE 
response capability.  
The plan to prepare local firefighters to respond to terrorist incidents makes sense 
since firefighters already have the benefit of advanced training with hazardous chemicals 
via the Hazardous Materials Technician training program. In 1985, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration developed the Hazardous Waste Operations and 
Emergency Response Guidance Manual. This facilitated the creation of hazardous 
materials response teams (Haz-Mat) within fire departments across the United States. The 
final standard, titled “HAZWOPER Standard 1910.120—Hazardous Waste Operations 
and Emergency Response,” provided a standard method of responding to hazardous-
waste emergencies in fixed facilities and those involving highway transportation 
incidents.  
Domestic events such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and international 
events such as the Tokyo sarin gas attack and the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi 
Arabia resulted in the President’s signing into law the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, which 
had the aim of preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction in the United States. In 
the late 1990s, the American Fire Service joined the U.S. domestic preparedness program 
as a first responder to CBRNE attacks. The Nunn-Lugar legislation directed the Secretary 
of Defense to train federal, state, and local first responders in emergency response related 
to weapons of mass destruction (CBRNE). The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) 
wrote a training strategy to prepare our nation to respond to WMD incidents that included 
10 disciplines involved in response performing 152 unduplicated tasks (Pelfrey, 2001). 
During the past 10 years, the fire service has advanced its scope of service to 
include response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) 
incidents and terrorist mass-casualty events. Shortly after 9/11, the pressure to build fire 
service capabilities was steady, and the fear of falling short when the next attack occurred 
was noticeable within the fire service and from local elected officials.  
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B. THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERALISM ON THE EVOLUTION OF FIRE 
SERVICE RESPONSE TO HOMELAND SECURITY INCIDENTS 
The fire service is an active partner in the homeland security enterprise. The 
homeland security enterprise includes federal, state, and local government elements. Prior 
to September 11, 2001, the foundation emergency-operations plans outlined the role and 
responsibility of local, state, and federal participants in what was then termed 
“emergency management.” After September 11, 2001, new expectations evolved, and the 
roles and responsibilities of local, state, and federal participants changed. The 
Department of Homeland Security adopted the existing emergency management structure 
for intergovernmental operations for homeland security (Gerber, 2005). Assessments 
continue to question the ability of local governments to achieve federally defined 
capabilities. Research identifies the influence that models of federalism and adopted 
structures like emergency management contribute to achieving homeland security.  
Evidence suggests that a distinct tension exists between local governments’ 
capability and the federal government’s expectations in homeland security. The federal 
government prepared its own list of expected capabilities for fire service first responders 
outside of a widely accepted standardized system within the National Fire Protection 
Association. The literature is consistent and covers the periods prior to, just after, and ten 
years past 9/11 (Wise, 2002; Kettl, 2003; United States Department of Homeland 
Security [DHS], 2010b). The causes of the tension between governmental actors include 
lack of trust, lack of ownership, and the lack of partnerships between federal and local 
government actors (National Academy of Public Administration, 2004).  
The behavior of bureaucratic institutions is important to the homeland security 
enterprise. James Q. Wilson, in his text Bureaucracy, described the struggles associated 
with a bureaucracy, including the difficulty of implementing policies from within large 
institutions like the Department of Homeland Security. Further, Wilson illustrates one of 
the notable challenges for government working within a rigid system that is not adaptive 
to the challenges of modern government (Wilson, 1989, p. 377).  
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After 9/11, the practice of emphasizing federal-state relations rather than federal-
local relations continued, even though the critical duties required the use of local fire, 
police, and emergency medical personnel (Caruson & MacManus, 2006). The top-down 
effect of this policy is consistent with coercive federalism (Fossett, Kettl, & Posner, 
2003). According to Clovis,  
the most recent documents, however, give no mention of federalism, and 
have changed the rhetoric from seeking coordination, and collaboration 
with state and local partners to merely seeking consultation with other 
levels of government. (Clovis, 2008a, p. 6)  
How do these rules relate to the participants within the homeland security system? 
The federal structure assumes that since it has delivered a set of rules for everyone to 
utilize, everyone is therefore prepared. The state structure assumes that since it has 
implemented the rules, it can expect local governments to execute the requirements as 
written. The local government position, however, is that the rules are complicated, no one 
asked for local government input, and local government can accomplish only a few, if 
any, of the proposed tasks.  
The subject of federalism is important to the research in context of these evolving 
roles and, more importantly, in the context of the new criteria that direct local-
government performance in the homeland security enterprise. Paul Posner, in his 
conference paper The Role of Home in Homeland Security: The Federalism Challenge, 
identified cooperative federalism as the more traditional model and coercive federalism 
as inevitable in light of the continued federal mandate on local and state governments 
(Fossett, Kettl, & Posner, 2003). Clovis, in Federalism, Homeland Security and National 
Preparedness: A Case Study in the Development of Public Policy, offers the concept that 
competitive federalism provides an opportunity for communities to join forces to 
accomplish a purpose, each providing inputs that result in commonly shared outputs 
(Clovis, 2006). The subject of federalism and national security has evolved since World 
War II, when the principal concern was that of an enemy attack on civilian targets. 
Emergency federalism, a method of coordinating local, state, and federal government  
 
 9 
planning during “normal times” and unified command during emergency incidents, 
satisfied the tension that occurs between centralization and decentralization (Collier, 
2008).  
Another perspective considered is the creation of a new theory that suggests a 
greater reliance on collaboration among federal, state, and local governments, titled 
collaborative federalism. Collaborative federalism is specific to the new relationships that 
exist within the homeland security enterprise. Tenets of collaborative federalism place the 
DHS in a facilitator role, with funding to state and local governments that have wide 
latitude in implementing homeland security programs. Collaborative federalism requires 
state and local governments to work both horizontally and vertically, making the best use 
of resources while maintaining a service cost approved by the taxpayer (Clovis, 2006).  
The problem of coordination is not new. According to Kettl:  
It is, at the core a problem of governance—of linking the elements of the 
U.S. system, governmental and nongovernmental—into a coordinated 
system of defense. It is a problem of defining what defense means, how 
much protection is enough, how much Americans are willing to pay for it, 
what sacrifices they are willing to tolerate, and how to make the system 
work effectively. It is, in brief, a problem of political leadership. (Kettl, 
2003) 
Building on Kettl’s notion that a fresh approach to solving coordination is a public 
management imperative, the use of “contingent coordination” looks promising.  
The problems associated with homeland security are not new in the arena of 
public administration. The challenge today is that, in place of managing public services 
for fixed demands such as snow removal or crowd control, public managers must devise 
systems that can react to a wide range of threats. The solutions to these problems require 
an investment in a collaborative response system involving many layers of government 
and external agencies. The remaining challenge for government leaders is the recognition 
that the efforts in preparation are expended for problems that “may occur rarely, and may 
never repeat” (Kettl, 2003).  
Between 2002 and 2010, the Department of Homeland Security developed and 
implemented a number of policy instruments, guidelines, and strategies intended to 
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secure the homeland and to develop response capability. During this same period, the 
United States taxpayer invested $34 billion into the creation of the homeland security 
enterprise (Kean, 2011). Government researchers and duly charged inspectors continue to 
highlight concerns with the homeland security enterprise, specifically its true ability to 
respond to terrorism and disasters, the complexity of current strategies, and the lack of 
systems to assess preparedness.  
The literature provides two conflicting positions when the subject of federal grant 
funding is included in the discussion. One position advocates “giv[ing] local governments 
flexibility; and more money to create a better system from the bottom up” (Kettl, 2003, 
p. 5). Another position argues that if the federal government does not pay for the 
function, “we won’t be able to do it” (Fossett, Kettl, & Posner, 2003, p. 37). The 
literature also expresses a position shared by local governments advocating for a change 
from categorical grants to block grants for greater flexibility. An opposing perspective on 
grant funding outlines the belief that the current grant process is too complicated, 
supports unhealthy competition, and stalls efforts to collaborate (Clovis, 2008a). 
Additional criticism of the grant programs includes uneven distribution, the need for 
competition among the participants, and the participation of fewer jurisdictions due to the 
transaction costs associated with the programs (Clovis, 2008a).  
Local and state governments claim that many of the strategies and directives from 
the department of Homeland Security lack their input and advice, and are therefore 
ineffective. The research provides documentation of various processes used to gather 
input from state, local, tribal, and territorial entities, and NGOs. Methods utilized to 
gather input include focus groups, task forces, surveys, on-site interviews, national 
committees, and regional committees. The research cannot assess the degree to which the 
information developed using these processes has influenced the final DHS policy. The 
efforts undertaken by the DHS to include local government subject-matter experts have 
been varied and the methods have been inconsistent; the process to assess outcomes has 
been nonexistent.  
Participants attending a conference at the Arlington County Fire Department 
focused on lessons learned from the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon offered suggestions by 
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discipline to improve regional homeland security. Focus group summaries concluded 
that, even though the initial response to an incident involves local first responders, DHS 
officials initially appear to be seeking input and advice on local issues primarily from 
emergency management officials at the state level. Further, most local fire and police 
chiefs and EMS directors appear to have no input into their own state’s emergency 
management organization (Arlington County, 2003).  
The review of the literature supports the concept that coordination in some form is 
a key element to successful homeland security response at the state and local government 
levels. For example, the literature suggests the use of an expanded nationwide mutual-aid 
system based on the National Incident Management System. The consensus among the 
reports is that no one jurisdiction can respond to the full range of threats—a position that 
is emphasized with the continued decline of local government budgets and, therefore, 
first responder positions (DHS, 2010c). Recent recommendations from the Bottom-Up 
Review Report (BUR) include the need to enhance disaster preparedness through close 
collaboration in order to establish shared objectives and capability standards. Further, the 
BUR recognizes the benefit of involving participants beyond the traditional coalitions 
and the need to seek innovative, non-traditional solutions to catastrophic events (DHS, 
2010d).  
While the federal government’s policies, guidance documents, plans, and systems 
outline a unity of effort among local, state, and federal response elements, the experience 
in practice and during incidents demonstrates that gaps in performance and coordination 
still exist. The Homeland Security enterprise has not developed the appropriate apparatus 
to provide the type of coordinated and integrated response that our communities require 
and our citizens expect.  
C. STRUCTURES THAT COORDINATE HOMELAND SECURITY 
The homeland security enterprise exists in varied forms across the United States, 
and the foundation is nestled in the emergency management framework that evolved from 
our efforts to secure the homeland as a possible target of nuclear attack during the cold 
war. The history of our earlier disaster management system is relative to today and helps 
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provide the context for the current system. To that end, the author reviewed a technical 
manual titled Civil Defense Urban Analysis, published in 1953, and a related abstract 
titled “Distributed preparedness: the spatial logic of domestic security in the United 
States” (Collier & Lakoff, 2008).  
One of the responses to the post-World War II strategic-bombing doctrine 
assessed our own vulnerability and considered how to prepare the U.S. home front for 
nuclear attack. Civil defense planning was born out of the 1951 Civil Defense Act, which 
also created the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), which—much like the 
Department of Homeland Security—set out on an important and far-reaching mission.  
The 1951 Civil Defense Act established the Federal Civil Defense Administration 
(FCDA), which set out to prepare the United States to confront a nuclear attack. The 
evolution of distributed preparedness as a discipline served disaster management so well 
that the concept was adapted to address other potential threats, such as hurricanes, 
earthquakes, and floods. The result of this evolution created a new field of expertise 
called “emergency management” (Collier & Lakoff, 2008).  
Collier and Lakoff examined two dimensions of distributed preparedness—
emergency federalism and vulnerability mapping—to assess their effectiveness on 
contemporary national security. With regard to background civil defense, planning 
focused on nuclear confrontation, then in the 1970s grew to include “all hazards 
planning,” and then migrated to include pandemics and terrorist attacks. The United 
States Civil Defense recognized the concerns over sovereignty of states and localities and 
the ability of local governments to respond to local problems. The states have “inherent 
powers” charged with coordinating civil defense functions and directing responders in an 
emergency.  
The USCD proposed two types of coordinated response: mutual aid and mobile 
response. Mutual aid is defined as a voluntary arrangement between communities to 
assist each other in time of need (horizontal coordination). Mobile response is defined as 
being vertically organized, focusing on emergency standby capacity, and being activated 
by the state to support an affected region. The primary responsibility for individual 
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citizens and communities was a state obligation. The federal government provides 
military support in the event of war-caused disasters. The USCD maintained a 
constitutional government; planning was conducted cooperatively; and emergencies that 
overwhelmed local resources used unified structures of command and coordination to 
meet temporary “exigencies of the situation.”  
Vulnerability mapping served an important role in emergency federalism since the 
USCD needed to understand response capacities in the event of an attack. The maps 
allowed planners to assess potential damage, identify response capability, and plan for 
resource deployment to maximize preparedness. The mapping process used three steps: 
target analysis, damage assessment, and contingency planning. Once the mapping process 
was complete, each responding agency received a map specific to its responsibility in 
order to clarify its role during an emergency response.  
In the mid-1950s, civil defense officials recognized the opportunity to use 
distributed preparedness to address other potential threats, such as hurricanes, 
earthquakes, and floods (Quarantelli, 1995).  
“These officials applied the technique of vulnerability mapping, and the 
emergency federalist model of coordination to the challenges of domestic 
natural disaster response. In doing so, civil defense went through a 
paradigm change to define a new field of expertise—emergency 
management.” (Collier & Lakoff, 2008) 
The momentum for institutional change to “all hazards” in 1979 led to the 
creation of a new consolidated Federal Emergency Management Agency that continued 
to use the federalist model. In 2002, the “schema of distributed preparedness” (Collier & 
Lakoff, 2008) was inherited by the new Department of Homeland Security and is 
evidenced in the guidance offered in the department’s officially sanctioned fifteen 
planning scenarios, such as dirty bomb, major hurricane, and influence pandemic.  
“Distributed preparedness was invented as a decentralized, civilian organizational 
form in part to ward off Cold War concerns about the emergence of a garrison state” 
(Collier and Lakoff, 2008). Where it intends to assess vulnerability and response to 
emergencies through the boundary of American federalism, the actual result is not an 
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excess of security but an absence of capability, as we witnessed during the response to 
Hurricane Katrina.  
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Table 1.   Generational Perspective on Civil Defense, Emergency Management, and 
Homeland Security  
Since its inception, the homeland security enterprise developed by overlaying 
response plans atop the existing disaster management system that originated as civil 
defense functions (Falkenrath, 2001). Since most local and county emergency-
management roles exist on a voluntary or part-time basis, using the fragmented civil 
defense structure forced the new homeland security enterprise to evolve within an already 
underperforming set of structures (Falkenrath, 2001). Table 1 provides an overview of the 
start and evolution of civil defense, the features driving the role performed, and the 
systems used to integrate first responders. Additional homeland security duties on top of 
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existing responsibilities created unreasonable expectations that deprived both roles of 
their due attention.  
We return to the problem of structure and the limitations that our chosen structure 
places upon our ability to organize, train, deploy, and command emergency-response 
resources. Falkenrath asserts that domestic preparedness is a national security program 
that relies on enhancements of the disaster management system, and “it is a federal 
program that requires capabilities to be produced by state and local agencies” 
(Falkenrath, 2001 p. 19). Further, the authorities and the resources associated with these 
programs are confusingly scattered across the bureaucracy.  
D. REGIONAL NETWORKS AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
Emergency incidents are complex events and require a building-block approach as 
complementary resources arrive and engage the incident. When faced with unique 
challenges, firefighters can adapt and overcome these challenges to gain control of the 
incident. It is a fundamental understanding that, as incident complexity increases—such 
as might be the case with a terrorist event—the seamless integration of emergency 
responders is of even greater importance to accomplish the mission. When faced with a 
high consequence, low-frequency event success is measured in the responder’s ability to 
remove people in the greatest danger, quickly diagnose injuries, treat injured patients, and 
rapidly transport those in need of emergency care.  
Regional coordination is not the sole answer to improving the homeland security 
enterprise. The GAO found that even though FEMA collects data from Urban Area 
Security Initiative regions, it has no method to measure the effectiveness of the projects 
for building regional preparedness capability. Further, when FEMA encouraged the UASI 
regions to involve regional preparedness partners from the metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) of 27 regions surveyed by GAO, 20 UASI regions reported that there were no 
plans to involve other communities (GAO, 2009). GAO reports identified the need for a 
national homeland security strategy in place of a purely federal strategy. The GAO 
concluded that regional approaches are important to ensure that federal spending is 
complimentary and coordinated and that it closes existing security gaps.  
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The Department of Homeland Security continues to develop polices for homeland 
security. One example is the evolution of the National Response Plan to the National 
Response Framework that now includes both strategic and operational plans. The 
National Response Framework serves as the federal overarching plan integrating local, 
state, and federal response elements. The NRF recognizes state and federal components, 
including the state emergency operations center, state coordinating officer, FEMA 
Regional Response Coordination Center and the Joint Field Office when established. The 
emergency support functions outline in detail the federal response and the use 
coordinators for each function. The missing language in the NRF is the inclusion of 
foundation guidance intended to build regional networks for response.  
Recommendations presented in “Perspective on Preparedness: Taking Stock Since 
9/11” by the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force include the 
necessity to include local governments, among others, in the policy and guidance process. 
Specifically, the task force recommended the inclusion of local, state, tribal, and 
territorial officials in all stages of policy development and implementation. The task force 
suggested that DHS connect existing regional and national advisory panels to create a 
unified policy advisory system (DHS, 2010c).  
 The task force recognized the importance to the national and regional advisory 
councils of regional inclusion. Referring to the regional advisory council as a “node” 
infers, as it should, that local, state, tribal, and territorial are components of the response 
network. The task force found value in embedding local, state, tribal, and territorial 
officials in FEMA’s national preparedness directorate (NPD) in order to provide NPD 
staff with a regional perspective and to provide two-way communication between the 
National Advisory Council (NAC) and the NPD.  
E. FEATURES OF REGIONAL RESPONSE CAPABILITY  
Recent literature outlines the study of response capability and its application to 
homeland security. Congress, research institutions, and homeland security practitioners 
continue to assess how grant-funding investments translate to response capability. The 
use of defined measurements, such as a vulnerability analysis of critical infrastructure, is 
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an example of methods undertaken by emergency planners to reinforce capability 
(Caruson & MacManus, 2008). The process of building response capability as a function 
of reliability is prospective and uses information gained from experience, prior response 
failures, and responses to the right questions (Jackson, 2008). Prior reports criticized the 
DHS for not providing uniform criteria to the first-responder community to accomplish 
the goal of building an integrated homeland security network.  
On March 17, 2011, William Jenkins, Jr., Director of Homeland Security and 
Justice Issues at the GOA, testified before the U.S Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Government Affairs. Jenkins testified that FEMA has implemented a 
number of efforts to define response capability and capability with no measurable 
success. The conceptual illustration submitted with Jenkins’s testimony visually depicts 
the problem facing local governments, such as the need for response capability in the 
initial stages of the emergency and the available response capability from the current 
system. DHS is reliant on the success of the regional network to gain control of major 
incidents during the initial operational period. 
The literature confirms that this specific challenge is not new. As early as 2001, 
Falkenrath raised this issue by noting that the domestic preparedness program relates to 
the execution of a particular legislative mandate (Falkenrath, 2001). The problem that 
Falkenrath notes is that a mandate that is too broad limits the ability of decision makers to 




Figure 1.   Capability Requirements and Capability Gaps (from Jenkins, 2011) 
Moving ahead once again, in 2007 Mackenzie M. Eaglen of the Heritage 
Foundation completed an assessment of the DHS budget for Fiscal Year 2008. While 
suggesting that Congress pass both the homeland security authorization and 
appropriations bills, Eaglen also recommended improvements to the system. Eaglen 
argued for the creation of a homeland security strategy that included all levels of 
government. In addition, she recommended investment in a “true” national preparedness 
system, in place of grant funds focused on individual state and local needs. Further 
Eaglen suggested that federal funding should help state and local governments integrate 
their counterterrorism, preparedness, and response efforts to support a national 
preparedness system (Eaglen, 2007).  
Recent efforts such as “Perspectives on Preparedness” (DHS, 2010c) brought 
together 36 stakeholders from local, state, tribal, and federal agencies to assess national 
preparedness and to solicit recommendations for improvement. One focus area was  
intended to improve response capability included the creation of a national mutual-aid 
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system based on the National Incident Management System. The proposal recognized the 
need to assess the policy, legal, and operational challenges that limit our current system. 
Notably, the participants recognized the current fiscal retrenchment that is influencing 
local public safety services, seeing this as an opportunity to encourage regionalized 
approaches. Another recommendation included the notion that no single jurisdiction can 
handle the full range of threats and hazards; the creation of a NIMS resourcing inventory 
capable of national deployment can improve the current homeland security system (DHS, 
2010b). Further, the task force identified an overarching recommendation: “Prioritize 
development, and phased implementation of a national preparedness assessment 
framework” (DHS, 2010b, p. 36).  
F. CONCLUSION 
A report card prepared by the Bipartisan Policy Center National Security 
Preparedness Group (Bipartisan Policy Center [BPC], 2011) asserts that, a decade after 
9/11, the nation is still not prepared for a catastrophic disaster. The BPC claims that the 
response system still lacks comprehensive planning across federal agencies, and with 
state and local authorities. “The DHS Inspector General found the federal government 
has not adequately developed catastrophic disaster operations plans to address ‘specific 
roles, responsibilities, and actions of each federal department, and agency responding to 
an incident’” (BPC, 2011). The absence of specific plans is a fundamental flaw that 
constrains local and state governments from maturing the homeland security enterprise—
and one that increases risks for first responders.  
The International Association of Fire Chiefs identifies formal interagency 
standard operating procedures, automatic aid that supports periods of peak demand, and 
the adoption of NIMS used daily in routine calls for service as good practices for regional 
coordination. These same practices proved successful during the Arlington County Fire 
Department and National Capital region response to the Pentagon on 9/11.  
The literature reviewed supports the notion that the way to strengthen the 
response to terrorism and natural disasters is by improving regional networks. The 
homeland security enterprise recognizes the need for regional solutions to improve 
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response capability and to maximize the return on federal grant investments. Planning is a 
key theme in the literature reviewed for this thesis. The development of a properly 
resourced regional catastrophic preparedness staff is justified since local government 
planning officials are often not able to gain experience in the planning discipline. The 
evolution of homeland security requires a model aimed toward creating networks and 
integrating existing resources. The fire service is in a position to advance a network 




This thesis is based on qualitative research methods designed to collect data on 
three regional networks: 1) National Capital region, 2) Kentucky, and 3) Philadelphia 
metropolitan region. The goal of this research is to identify the type of network that can 
improve the use of existing fire service resources from among the existing features of 
successful regions.  
The research includes the assessment of current practices and policies, the 
influence of planning, and model networks that coordinate local fire service for homeland 
security. The research identifies the features of successful regions and reviews existing 
formal networks, such as the Metropolitan Planning Organization, that service shared 
federal, state, and local functions within regions.  
1. Case Studies 
Three case studies identify features that contributed to the successful integration 
of regional resources. The case study is best suited for this evaluation since it allows for 
an interpretation that “enables the researcher to (a) gain new insights about a particular 
phenomenon, (b) develop new concepts or theoretical perspectives about the 
phenomenon, and/or (c) discover the problem that exists within the phenomenon” 
(Peshkin, 1993). Limitations of the case study include the failure to consider the practical 
acceptance of the new structure and the importance of increased cost in the current fiscal 
environment. In an effort to develop the best options, the analysis includes recent bodies 
of work and offer examples from other public provisions that can serve as a template for 
the homeland security enterprise. 
The case studies included the National Capital region (NCR), Kentucky, and the 




examples of successful regional response during emergencies and attributes that help 
create regional networks (Bogard, 2011; Arlington County, 2003; GAO, 2004). The 
salient points of these particular case studies include the following:  
• The NCR has a thirty-five-year history in regional intergovernmental 
relations and demonstrates an optimal integration of eight fire service 
agencies. Further, the NCR response to the Pentagon on 9/11 is an 
example of a successful response and a model for other regions. 
• Kentucky provides a good example since, during the winter ice storm of 
2009, the state experienced a challenging operational period that provided 
a number of examples of successful regional efforts and illustrated the 
limitations caused by a failure to have situational awareness and to adapt 
its system.  
• The Philadelphia Metropolitan Region is constrained by four potential 
barriers to regional networks: 1) two states, 2) two FEMA regions, 3) 317 
local emergency management directors, and 4) segments of the region 
outside the UASI region. Specifically, the analysis examines the 
jurisdictional limitations, emergency-management framework, response 
capability, and policy issues. One segment of the region provides a 
positive example of partial regional coordination. 
Features identified in the case studies were then applied to recommendations for 
the metropolitan Philadelphia region. Where appropriate, federal guidance that supports 
these recommendations is cited.  
2. Federalism 
Two additional question posed by this research were to determine how federalism 
affects the regional integration of fire service and how we address the tension that results 
from not having a functional network that coordinates federal, state, and local 
government activities. To answer these questions, a literature review was conducted.  
B. DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION 
The general data reviewed provided context for the current challenges within the 
entire homeland security response system. The literature includes work that assesses 
major incidents, like 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, and the capability of homeland security 
efforts implemented thus far. Literature that outlines specific reforms to homeland 
security policy around regional systems and improving networks is included in the 
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sources. The research assesses after-action reports, inspector general reports, and 
Department of Homeland Security reviews and directives to determine what is working, 
existing failure points, and suggested improvements to the system.  
The research reviews the academic discussion of federalism and the effect that 
these policies have on the homeland security enterprise. The subject of federalism is 
central to the development of recommendations for an integrative response network.  
1. Case Study Data 
The NCR case study draws upon documents that outline the formation and 
structure of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, the NCR Strategic 
Plans, and the Regional Emergency Coordination Plans. The NCR’s maturity, due to its 
35-year history, is beneficial to the research. Further after-action reports on the 9/11 
Pentagon response and remarks made by Arlington County Fire Chief James Schwartz 
provide the background on their lessons learned and suggestions for other regional 
networks.  
The Kentucky case study examines a thesis by Amanda Bogard that reviewed the 
experience in the state of Kentucky and assessed its performance after the 2009 Kentucky 
ice storm. The thesis provides research and analysis on the effects of leadership and 
regionalization on response capability. The Kentucky data provides information relative 
to the results of an actual major disaster; like the NCR case study, it provides examples of 
features that support effective regional networks.  
The Philadelphia metropolitan region case study examines information about the 
legal framework, as it exists in Pennsylvania and New Jersey relative to homeland 
security and emergency management. State emergency management internet sources 
provide most of the research material, with additional material from the county 
emergency manager when the data were not available online. The data include a review 
of the structures used in Pennsylvania to create the regional task forces and the New 
Jersey structure that lacks a regional operational connection.  
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2. Federalism Data 
The research reviews the academic discussion of federalism and the effect of 
these policies on the homeland security enterprise. The subject of federalism is central to 
the analysis of the emergency management framework and the options that encourage an 
efficient and integrative response network. The literature review includes the most recent 
policy directives from the Department of Homeland Security and DHS goals for regional 
networks.  
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Case Study Analysis 
Next, the research identified successful examples of regional networks from the 
literature review. Within these examples, the review outlined how each case study 
demonstrated success and developed a list to catalog those attributes that occur under the 
heading of leadership. The analysis provided an opportunity to identify recurring 
attributes that support successful regional networks and a list of recommendations for the 
Philadelphia metropolitan region.  
The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC, 2011) provides guidance for 
community leaders and fire chiefs to benchmark their preparedness efforts and 
capabilities. The research compares the case studies where applicable to features that 
demonstrate minimal coordination, including failure to conduct community assessments, 
informal SOPs used for response, and general orientation of equipment. Emerging 
coordination includes a limited assessment and some coordination, initial steps to train 
personnel, and limited situational awareness. Optimum coordination includes complete 
assessments, multi-agency training, and embedded NIMS in SOPs used daily. The IAFC 
created a checklist for fire chiefs and community preparedness leaders to help prepare 
communities for terrorist incidents and all-hazard disasters. The analysis for this purpose 
compares each case study against the optimal performance outlined by the IAFC and then 
applies these features to a list of recommendations for the Philadelphia metropolitan 
region. In addition, the case study identifies patterns of behavior that create an 
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environment for affinity, or likeness, and those that constrain integration. The analysis of 
the literature along with the assessment of the regional networks concludes around the 
following attributes: 1) structure, 2) features, 3) leadership.  
2. Federalism Analysis 
The research begins with a review of the literature on federalism, since it is an 
important subject in the homeland security enterprise. The analysis provides insight into 
the evolving relationship among federalism, disaster management, and local government 
public safety. The analysis reviews each model of management to assess potential 
benefits and limitations against three criteria: 1) the model’s effect on the creation of a 
regional network, 2) the model’s influence on the long-term maturity of the regional fire 
services as part of homeland security, and 3) the model’s funding source, whether federal, 
state/local, or both.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The United States fire service has a unique role to support the domestic homeland 
security mission in the response to terrorist incidents. The delivery system relies on the 
U.S emergency management framework as a foundation, and this reliance constrains 
regional response capability. This thesis creates a new way of engaging regional fire 
services, and outlines the steps necessary to mature the system using regional fire service 
resources. The research proposes integrative models that create a unity of effort. 
Although literature exists on the problems of regional coordination, there is limited 
research on recommendations to improve integration of fire services in metropolitan 
regions. 
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IV. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The research provides an assessment of three regional emergency response 
systems and those features that may demonstrate good practices for others to follow. The 
three cases include: 1) the National Capital region, 2) Kentucky, and 3) the Philadelphia 
metropolitan region.  
Each case study is organized into three subsections. The first subsection includes 
an overview of the structures involved, such as the legal formation, federal, state, and 
local jurisdictional boundaries, and other areas such as UASI and FEMA regions. The 
second subsection identifies features that contribute to the success of the region. The third 
subsection outlines the effects of leadership and the attributes of effective leadership in 
the regional systems.  
B. CASE STUDY OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION 
1. Structure 
The National Capital region (NCR) can be considered a high-performance region 
because of the positive results experienced during the terrorist attack on the Pentagon on 
9/11 (Arlington County, 2002). Efforts to coordinate emergency response date back to the 
mid-1970s, and relate to a regional vision that strengthens each fire service participant. 
Starting in 1975, Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria counties initiated a borderless 
response plan that allows the closest fire or EMS unit to respond, regardless of 
jurisdiction. Successful networks require a foundation to build upon, and in Arlington 
County, the network starts with the county emergency management plan (CEMP). 
Arlington distinguishes itself by keeping its plan up to date, frequently practicing the 
plan, and demonstrating competence when implementing the plan. This effort may seem 
fundamental, but in practice, jurisdictions often fail to invest time in their emergency 
management plan. In addition, Arlington benefits from frequent training, exercising, and 
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incident experience with partners in the Washington metropolitan area, all of which 
contributed to a successful Pentagon response. In this regard, Arlington demonstrates the 
ability to “imagine” the complexity of a terrorist event and involve a diverse group of 
partners from federal, state, and local governments.  
The National Capital region includes the District of Columbia, including the 
Supreme Court and the United States Capitol; Montgomery and Prince George’s counties 
in Maryland; Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William counties in Virginia; and 
all cities existing in Maryland or Virginia. The Metropolitan Washington Council of 
Governments (COG) is a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit association representing state, local 
governments, state legislatures, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Policies created by the COG include a regional emergency coordination plan that 
provides the structure for coordination, planning, communications, and information 
sharing during and after a regional emergency. Notably the plan is “deliberately broad” 
so that it is scalable to the scope of a regional emergency. The plan conforms to the 
National Response Framework and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
Comprehensive Planning Guide (CPG) 101, and the National Incident Management 
System. In addition, the COG has created a Regional Incident Communications and 
Coordination System and a Regional Incident Tracking System using a web interface.  
The National Capital region utilizes a planning process to achieve its priority 
capabilities during a three-to-five-year period. The strategic plan outlines four goals that 
build upon the prior year’s success and outline the updated vision of the region. An 
investment plan that outlines the priority investments and projects for the region supports 
the strategic plan. A performance measurement plan monitors the progress of these 
investments and keeps the regional partners informed of project status.  
Planning as an activity is important to regional structures because it engages 
participants in goal setting and develops a sense of ownership for activities undertaken. In 




each other and their respective organizations. Interjurisdictional relationships and 
planning are two frequently noted solutions to build and strengthen regional response 
capabilities (Arlington, 2003).  
FEMA coordinates regional emergency management activities through the Office 
of the National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC). Congress established this office to 
provide direct coordination to the region and to provide technical support to secure the 
homeland. This example of focused coordination in support of the region and federal, 
state, and local relations is an effective model to advance the homeland security 
discipline. The NCR illustrates that effective networks can successfully integrate new 
networks, as observed in their participation as one of eleven Tier 1 Urban Area Security 
Initiative regions. The use of complementary networks in metropolitan regions is one 
process that can facilitate maturing the homeland security enterprise.  
2. Features 
Analysis of the NCR reveals a network that has long-term experience 
coordinating emergency response. The NCR performs at an optimal level and includes a 
regional emergency coordination plan, complete comprehensive risk analysis of NCR 
critical infrastructure, and key resources (CI/KR). NCR baseline capabilities include 
CBRNE detection and response and NIMS embedded in SOPs used daily. The NCR 
shares computer-aided dispatch (CAD), voice, and data and is working to increase access 
to video systems for all NCR response partners.  
The Arlington County Fire Department is an experienced collaborator and served 
with the United States Public Health Service to develop the prototype Metropolitan 
Medical Response System (MMRS). The MMRS provides chemical-response capability, 
on-site, emergency health, and medical services joining public safety and local medical-
care professionals. The NCR MMRS is the model for the other MMRS systems across 
the nation. The outcome of this partnership produced a template for 100 metropolitan 
regions and is an example of the type of outcomes possible from an investment in 
regional networks (Arlington County, 2002).  
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Regional Function Demonstration of Optimal Performance  
Assessment Assess regional ability to respond to WMD and CBRNE, Regional 
Emergency Coordination Plan 
Assessment Active partnerships with all fire service agencies, risk analysis of 
NCR (CI/KR), key collaboration on a regular basis 
Preparedness Training for all personnel, performance of multi-agency full 
function exercises  
Preparedness Increase capacity for medical surge and response, sustain mass 
care and evacuation capabilities, ER tracking for patient treatment 
capacities 
Response Integrate incident command post with emergency operations center 
for situational awareness, NIMS embedded in SOPs and used in all 
responses 
Response Automatic aid regularly used 
Table 2.   Features of the National Capital Region 
 
Successful Attributes NCR Demonstration 
Affinity-likeness Region is constructed of like communities with similar 
public safety services 
Planning 3-5 strategic plans outline 4 goals and an investment plan 
outlines priorities; annual work plan outlines grant funded 
projects 
Leadership commitment Signals its commitment to the entire organization 
Shared purpose What is gained together cannot be achieved individually 
Trust Can sustain the collaboration even in the face of 
disagreement 
Table 3.   Successful Region Attributes: NCR Case Study 
3. Leadership 
Arlington County Fire Chief Jim Schwartz outlined those factors that he attributes 
to successful collaborations. To provide some context, the National Capital region has 
enjoyed 35 years of regional collaborative experience. Prior to 9/11, Chief Schwartz was 
instrumental in applying visionary solutions to new and emerging problems concerning 
homeland security and response; specifically his role in creating the Metropolitan 
Medical Response System was instrumental.  
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Leadership is the first requirement. According to Schwartz, once the jurisdiction’s 
leader makes a commitment to working together, this “signals” a commitment to the 
entire organization (Schwartz, 2011). The second requirement is the participants’ 
understanding of the shared purpose and the knowledge that what they gain together 
cannot be achieved individually. Third, the participants need to understand the structure 
of the collaboration and their place in the structure. The fourth factor, according to 
Schwartz, is trust, which can sustain collaboration even in the face of disagreement and 
cannot be ranked in comparison to the other three factors. The NCR case study outlines 
successful regional attributes identified from the experience in Arlington County using 
data from the after-action report, lessons-learned conference, and remarks from Fire 
Chief Jim Schwartz. The case study provides examples from the NCR that demonstrate 
the connection between their experience and successful attributes. 
C. CASE STUDY OF KENTUCKY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
1. Structure  
In the state of Kentucky, the emergency management function is placed with the 
Kentucky Department of Military Affairs. Chapter 39 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes 
provides the legal formation, scope of duties, and structure for the emergency 
management functions. Chapter 39G outlines the legal formation, scope of duties, and 
structure for the Kentucky Office of Homeland Security. Kentucky administers 
emergency management using 11 administrative regions that oversee 120 counties in the 
state.  
2. Features 
An analysis of the experience during the 2009 Kentucky ice storm reveals a list of 
benefits associated with regional networks that enhanced response capability and 
coordination during a period of peak activity. The Kentucky case study provides 
examples of resource allocation across jurisdictions related to regional efforts that 
occurred prior to the major emergency; those efforts took the form of EM exercises. 
Kentucky counties that implemented regional area commands reported enhanced 
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communications. In those Kentucky counties that implemented regionalization during the 
ice storm, features associated with elevated performance appear when compared to other 




Demonstration of Emerging Performance 
Assessment Limited assessment completed and some relationship developed 
Assessment Prior planning and collaboration occurs through hospital preparedness 
program 
Preparedness Training for all personnel; training and network activities during prior 
year assist in preparedness 
Preparedness Counties that previously implemented Area Command during regional 
exercises did so during the storm (25%) 
Response Situational awareness with external organizations that formed area 
commands and 1 region of 11 formally regionalized 
Response Identified response challenges as calls for service increased to overrun 
state EOC 
Table 4.   Features of Kentucky Emergency Management 2009 Ice Storm 
Successful Attributes Demonstration 
Shared purpose During Kentucky ice storm 11 counties formed an area 
command 
Leadership Emergency management should be the lead for 
regionalization 
County emergency managers Recommend full time county EM directors 
Shared purpose Area managers prioritize needs and provide a holistic 
picture to state EOC (11 regions in place of 120 
counties) 
Table 5.   Successful Region Attributed—Kentucky Case Study 
3. Leadership 
The regional experience in the state of Kentucky during the 2009 ice storm 
provides a good example of the benefit of integration prior to an incident. Amanda 
Bogard (2011) reviewed the effects that regional coordination had on response capability 
after the 2009 Kentucky ice storm. Bogard’s research reports that, where regionalized 
efforts did occur during the ice storm, those same counties had previously implemented 
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regional coordination during earthquake exercises conducted in March 2008. The 
counties that did not regionalize reported the following failures: inability to communicate 
because of infrastructure failure, single counties overwhelmed with their own responses 
and political barriers (Bogard, 2011, p. 64). Bogard claims that an area command using 
area managers would allow for a more holistic picture to the state EOC, and this would 
allow the state to focus on 11 regions, instead of 120 counties. The Kentucky experience 
is consistent with the Arlington County Conference Report, which recognized the 
importance of interjurisdictional relationships and the benefit of standardized planning 
and training.  
Recommendations made by Bogard include the need for full-time county 
emergency managers funded by the State Division of Emergency Management. 
Conclusions for the National Capital region also recommended greater simplicity of 
coordination through the establishment of eight county or city emergency manager 
positions. The fragmented civil defense format, empowering an emergency manager 
within every jurisdiction, constrains the homeland security enterprise. The Kentucky case 
study outlines successful regional attributes that occurred during a statewide ice storm. 
The case study provides examples from Kentucky that demonstrate the connection 
between its experience and successful attributes. 
D. CASE STUDY OF PHILADELPHIA METROPOLITAN REGION 
1. Structure  
The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency is headquartered in 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the state capital. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management 
Services Code, Chapter 73, Commonwealth Services outlines the powers and duties of 
the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA). Pennsylvania’s Homeland 
Security Directorate was formed within and functions under PEMA. PEMA serves as the 
state administrative agency (SAA) for all homeland security funding.  
The PEMA structure in Pennsylvania includes area offices in central, western, and 
eastern Pennsylvania, which provide coordination to local emergency management 
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coordinators and elected officials. The PEMA system also requires that each political 
subdivision (i.e., county, city, borough, incorporated town, and township) have an 
emergency-management program including a trained emergency management 
coordinator (EMC), an emergency operations plan (EOP), and an emergency operations 
center (EOC). Specific to counterterrorism, in 2002 Pennsylvania passed Act 227, the 
Counterterrorism Planning, Preparedness, and Response Act, which outlines 
counterterrorism planning, preparedness, and response. In addition, Act 227 defines the 
powers and duties of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the 
Pennsylvania Department of Health, and the nine regional response task forces in the 
state.  
Through Act 227, Pennsylvania created nine regional response task forces to 
coordinate emergency response operations. The Southeastern Pennsylvania Regional 
Task Force uses a collaborative approach to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
emergencies. The task force includes specialized units, such as the Major Incident 
Response Team (MIRT), SWAT, and hazardous-materials teams, and county-based bomb 
squads. The task force mission area requires that the following activities be carried out:  
(a) Formalize regional mutual aid and intergovernmental agreements to 
respond to weapons-of-mass-destruction events, chemical emergencies, 
and other man-made, and natural disasters; 
(b) Establish an interoperable communications system within the region and 
western Pennsylvania for all emergency response agencies; 
(c) Develop a specialized equipment resource pool specific to WMD 
responses utilized throughout the region; 
(d) Ensure that specialized WMD training is available to all emergency 
services personnel and support agencies as necessary; 
(e) Apply as a group for grant funding for special acquisitions and projects;  
(f) Foster positive networking for information, technical applications, law 
enforcement intelligence, and incident prevention; and form solid 
relationships among all group members and participants; 
(g) Develop regional response and intelligence protocol and procedures; and  
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(h) Develop the ability to deliver highly trained and equipped teams of 
responders capable of minimizing the effects of a terrorist incident within 
the region. (Pennsylvania, 2002) 
Within the Philadelphia metropolitan region, the Philadelphia FBI-Joint Terrorism 
Task Force (JTTF) serves to coordinate counterterrorism functions. The Philadelphia 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) is a Tier I-designated Urban Area and currently 
encompasses Philadelphia and the surrounding Pennsylvania counties of Montgomery, 
Bucks, Chester, and Delaware in the UASI program.  
 
County Population Sq. Mi. Communities County EM Local EM 
Philadelphia 1,526,006 142 1 1 N/A 
Chester   498,894 715 74 1 74 
Delaware   558,028 184 49 1 49 
Bucks   625,249 622 31 1 31 
Montgomery   861,543 487 62 1 62 
Total 4,069,723 2,150 217 5 216 
Table 6.   Emergency Management Coordinators by Pennsylvania County within the 
Philadelphia Metropolitan Region (from Pennsylvania State Municipal 
Statistics, 2011) 
The New Jersey Office of Emergency Management (NJOEM) is headquartered in 
Trenton, the state capital. The structure in New Jersey—unlike in Pennsylvania—places 
the emergency management function as a section within the New Jersey State Police 
(NJSP) Homeland Security Branch. Three regional offices provide direct support to 
county emergency managers from the north, central, and south regional offices. Similar 
to Pennsylvania, the NJOEM system requires an appointed county emergency 
management coordinator, and each political subdivision (i.e., county, city, borough, 
incorporated town, and township) has an emergency management program including a 
trained emergency management coordinator (EMC), an emergency operations plan 
(EOP), and an emergency operations center (EOC). 
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The New Jersey Civilian Defense and Disaster Control Act (A: 9-33) outlines the 
authority and duties of the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management (NJOEM). 
Executive Order #5 outlines the powers and duties of the New Jersey Domestic Security 
Preparedness Task Force (NJDSPTF), which reports directly to the governor and is 
responsible for setting homeland security and domestic preparedness policy. The 
NJDSPTF functions within the Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (OHSP). 
The OHSP serves as the state administrative agency (SAA) for all homeland security 
funding. It is run by a director appointed by the governor. The current structure has the 
New Jersey State Police maintaining control of emergency management; however, the 
superintendant of the State Police reports to the director of the Office of Homeland 
Security, Office of Preparedness and the state attorney general on matters relating to 
homeland security and preparedness. 
 
County Population Sq. Mi. Communities County EM Local EM 
Camden 517,234 222 37 1 37 
Burlington 445,475 804 40 1 40 
Gloucester 287,860 324 24 1 24 
Total 1,250,569 1,365 101 3 101 
Table 7.   Emergency Management Coordinators by New Jersey County within the 
Philadelphia Metropolitan Region (from New Jersey Municipal Data Book, 
2010) 
2. Features 
In Pennsylvania, the functional network in place uses the nine regional response 
task forces that engage multi-county jurisdictions. Pennsylvania also benefits from the 
alignment of the Philadelphia-UASI region with the regional task force as a network 
within a network, and it has enhanced projects in both systems.  
In New Jersey, the Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (OHSP) has 
created 21 county working groups (CWG) that serve as multi-disciplinary planning 
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groups for each county. The CWG is charged with prioritizing needs, coordinating 
activities, and implementing homeland security initiatives. Each CWG includes 
representatives from county government, the county OEM coordinator, the prosecutor’s 
office, police, fire, and EMS associations, haz-mat team, the health department, critical 
infrastructure, the domestic preparedness planner, and a representative of the largest local 
government entity. Where Pennsylvania Act 227 creates a network centered on building 
response capability, the New Jersey OHSP county work group process creates a 
coordinating mechanism that primarily focuses on procurement, rather than operational-
centered activities across the region.  
 
Regional Function Demonstration of Emerging Performance 
Assessment Regional collaboration to prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from emergencies  
Assessment Creates a network within a network for planning, priorities, and 
projects, UASI & SPARTF 
Preparedness Establishes interoperable communications with region, training 
for all personnel, conducts multi-agency exercises  
Preparedness Strategic regional focus for grant funding and projects  
Response Develops regional response and intelligence protocol, formal 
regional mutual aid and intergovernmental agreements for 
response 
Response Regional response procedures, regional haz-mat, SWAT, bomb 
squads and major incident response teams 




Successful Attributes Demonstration  
Affinity-likeness Region consists of 4 county governments and 1 metro city 
government with similar public-safety services 
Planning The task force applies as a group for grants and special 
funding; the region aligns with UASI boundaries  
Leadership commitment County EM directors and elected officials signal their 
commitment 
Shared purpose What is gained together cannot be achieved individually 
Trust Can sustain the collaboration even in the face of disagreement 
Table 9.   Successful Region Attributes—Southeast Pennsylvania Regional Task 
Force 
Differences in the Philadelphia metropolitan region include the jurisdictional 
division between two states, separate FEMA regional boundaries for New Jersey and the 
exclusion of southern New Jersey from the Philadelphia UASI boundaries, and the lack 
of regional program collaboration within the southern New Jersey border counties. The 
SPARTF case study outlines successful regional attributes identified from the experience 
in five Pennsylvania counties, including Philadelphia, using data outlining the formation 
and results of task force efforts. The case study provides examples from the SPERTF that 
demonstrate the connection between that experience and successful attributes. 
 
Regional Function Demonstration of Minimum Performance 
Assessment No regional assessment complete outside of critical infrastructure  
Assessment County working groups (CWG) serve as a multi-disciplinary 
planning group for each county 
Preparedness Awareness training for some personnel, haz-mat specialist 
training for participating departments 
Preparedness NJ is within 10-mile UASI boundary but is not actively 
participating in UASI projects 
Response Limited situational awareness with external organizations, haz-
mat task force response in place 
Response Lacks formal SOPs for response; no formal operational protocol 
in region 
Table 10.   Features of New Jersey Counties (Philadelphia Metropolitan Region) 
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3. Leadership 
One of the signals of commitment is the affirmation of regional leaders 
participating on collaborative projects like the Southeastern Pennsylvania Regional Task 
Force (SPARTF). All Pennsylvania county emergency management directors sent a clear 
signal to their staffs that they are participating and working toward mutual goals for the 
region. In addition, the participants in SPARTF collectively prioritize their missions and 
recognize that the same capabilities are not attainable without the regional task force. 
New Jersey has not experienced the same leadership success demonstrated in 
Pennsylvania. New Jersey efforts include county multi-discipline groups working 
independently and efforts focused on homeland security grant purchasing without a 
regional homeland security strategy. 
E. FEDERALISM ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Federalism is at the center of the tension to advance the homeland security 
enterprise. The principal national preparedness documents are silent on the subject of an 
appropriate structure that provides a meaningful federal, state, and local government 
response. Disaster management is part of the foundation structure for local government 
public safety and includes a uniform national policy that directs how the government, 
NGOs, and the private sector are to coordinate and respond to emergencies.  
In 1993, Congress mandated that the National Academy of Public Administration 
complete an objective study of the government’s ability to respond to major natural 
disasters. This study was requested in response to failures experienced during Hurricane 
Andrew. NAPA concluded that, “old imperatives about the need to protect national 
security in established ways are being challenged by pressing domestic needs” (NAPA, 
1993, p. iii). The panel highlighted the challenge of powers divided among federal, state, 
and local governments, and it emphasized the need to create a national system of 
emergency management.  
According to Falkenrath , the domestic preparedness program is a subset of the 
U.S. counterterrorism policy. The execution of the domestic preparedness program is  
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remote from every other U.S. counterterrorism activity. Falkenrath claims that the 
domestic preparedness program is thus a hybrid of these two distinct functions and results 
in a number of the program’s problems (Falkenrath, 2001).  
Posner identified cooperative federalism as the traditional model and coercive 
federalism as likely in light of continued federal policy mandates. Clovis posits that 
competitive federalism is a method for communities to share resources (Clovis, 2006). 
Emergency federalism, popular during World War II, provides a method to coordinate 
planning in normal times and to unify command elements during emergency incidents, 
when the principal concern at the time was that of an enemy attack on civilian targets 
(Collier, 2008).  
Current assumptions used by the federal and state governments to make decisions 
regarding local government fire services are frequently misaligned with the local 
operating picture. According to Clovis (2008), flawed assumptions continue to constrain 
the level of preparedness in our country. If we intend to advance intergovernmental 
management, then we need to understand what limits the process from serving the 
homeland security enterprise today. To solve this problem, Clovis proffered the use of the 
jurisdictional model and the network model. The jurisdictional model focuses on strategic 
planning and an assessment of the emergency management priorities. What events can 
exhaust local resources, and when will the jurisdiction require external support? The 
assessment includes a determination of whether it is best to focus investment on 
mitigation and protection or on response and recovery. Clovis cautions that some 
government professionals lack strategic planning experience; he offers collaborating with 
academic institutions to provide technical assistant to the community as a solution 
(Clovis, 2009).  
Agranoff and McGuire pose the network model as appropriate for public safety, 
emergency management, and homeland security. The network model is subject to many 
barriers, such as loss of sovereign, free riding, labor issues, access to revenue, access to 
information, resistance to change, lack of vision, lack of leadership, lack of time, and 
other issues. The core of this model is making use of exiting resources or temporary 
excess capacity since the event is “geographically contained.” The model is most 
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effective in dealing with horizontal integration of capacities that provide support for fixed 
durations. On those occasions when the entire region is committed, such as in the case of 
a flood, resources from other regions may be necessary to provide support. Instead of 
dictating the specific makeup of the network, the DHS can allow the local jurisdiction to 
use its local conditions to determine the best approach.  
 
Question Model Effect 







One-size-fits-all solutions are not supported by local 
governments nor can they perform as intended 
Donor-
Recipient 
National policies implemented at the local government 
level fail to consider local conditions and fail to make 
use of regional excess capacity 
Jurisdiction 
Regional planning and goal setting can support the 
creation and development of a regional network 
Network 
Regional networks create efficient networks capable of 
performing during times of peak activity and crisis 
Table 11.   Intergovernmental Management Models and Effect on Regional Networks 
 
Question Model Influence 











The system is not able to advance participant skills since 
focus is limited to task execution 
Donor-
Recipient 
The system provides some development of participant 
skills in organizing, project management, and leadership 
Jurisdiction 
The system provides opportunity for strategic planning, 
collaboration, and leadership 
Network 
The system provides opportunity for strategic planning, 
regional problem analysis, and leadership 
Table 12.   Intergovernmental Management Models and Their Influence on Maturing 
the Homeland Security Enterprise 
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Top-Down X  Categorical grants administered by 




Categorical grants, greater 
flexibility, less stringent 
compliance 
Jurisdiction X X Strategic view of grants, focused 
on meeting program needs 
Network  X 
Network provides resources with 
the understanding that others will 
augment the network with their 
own source resources when needed 
Table 13.   Funding Sources for Intergovernmental Management Models 
Federalism is a challenge to homeland security; however, federalism is not a 
barrier to securing the homeland or creating regional fire service networks. Leadership is 
essential to adapting management models to suit the jurisdiction and to advance regional 
network structures.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Success in battle is not a function of how many show up, but who they are.  
Gen. Robert Barrow 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The fire service is an under-utilized resource that can close existing response 
capability gaps and fulfill the planning objective identified in the prevention mission area 
of the National Preparedness Goal. The fire service contribution to the homeland security 
profession is approaching its tenth year, and it continues to struggle with institutional bias 
that approaches every incident with legacy solutions that solve problems that only occur 
infrequently.  
The homeland security enterprise relies on an interdependent set of relationships 
that exist uncomfortably among the federal, state, and local governments. The scheme of 
emergency management and emergency response in the local government setting has 
changed in a measured and consequential manner since the introduction of the civil 
defense program of distributed preparedness in the 1950s.  
The requirement to integrate local government first responders, health, public 
works, NGOs, and the citizens of the community is a common conclusion; what is needed 
is a network to achieve the result. Further, the fire service needs to advance its response 
structure from legacy roles to a regional force that is “all hazards” capable. Large fire 
service agencies and regions such as Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago enjoy the 
capacity to adapt their own systems. Most if not all other fire service agencies and 
regions need a new framework for success. Further, the enterprise participants need to 
develop ways of relating that build cohesion and are vastly different from the current 
system.  
Catastrophic destruction and the loss of human life have a way of emphasizing the 
problems associated with our fragmented fire service system. However, our experience 
over three decades causes us to conclude that we continue to resist the adoption of a new  
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system in favor of an existing system that fails us. On this particular subject, Kuhn wrote, 
“Though they may begin to lose faith, and then consider alternatives, they do not 
renounce the paradigm that has led them to crisis” (Kuhn, 1996, p.77).  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PHILADELPHIA METROPOLITAN 
REGION 
1. Create a Regional Fire Service Network Model 
The fire service plays a vital role in the response to terrorism and natural 
disasters. Current response schemes follow long-standing traditions tasked for structural 
firefighting, rather than the needs required to manage a terrorist incident. In addition, the 
regional fire service network needs to integrate with federal and state response elements 
whose aim is to fulfill the mission of the homeland security enterprise. The network 
model builds capacity using existing available resources and builds networks of 
cooperation. The network model requires agency leaders to embrace a planning process 
that views the jurisdiction at the core of all activities in place of a frame focused on a 
single community. As noted in the NCR case study, the daily use of automatic aid 
coupled with integrated NIMS builds the cohesion needed to overcome difficulty in the 
face of a terrorist incident or large-scale disaster.  
2. Create Strong Roles for County Emergency Managers and Re-
purpose Local Government Emergency Managers 
The Kentucky case study makes the claim that every county needs a full-time 
county emergency manager due to the importance and complexity of the tasks. The NCR 
and Philadelphia case studies support the benefit of strong county emergency managers to 
serve as facilitators and coordinators.  
The regional response and planning network comes with a stronger role for 
county emergency management staff, but less utility in the network for local government 
emergency management coordinators. The new emerging role for local government 
emergency managers centers around the actions required from the people and the 
institutions within the community. One option to repurpose the cadre of local emergency 
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management coordinators is to direct the activities of our community emergency 
response teams (CERT) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as churches, 
social organizations, and American Legions in order to qualify and empower local 
businesses to support volunteer efforts in preparation for and after a disaster. The result 
of this change can support the development of a robust system to build the type of 
resilient communities referenced in current DHS preparedness goals.  
3. Adopt a Jurisdictional Model for Planning and Emergency 
Management 
The community emergency management plan serves as the foundation of an all-
hazards plan to address terrorist incidents, emergencies, and natural disasters. The NCR 
case study illustrates the benefits of an up-to-date and frequently practiced emergency 
management plan. Based on the NCR and Philadelphia metropolitan case studies, we can 
conclude that effective planning and coordination is best facilitated from the county 
government level. The analysis places emphasis on the importance of planning and the 
benefit that jurisdictional models provide for the entire homeland security enterprise.  
The fire service in general is an ideal planning partner for the homeland security 
enterprise because it possesses intimate knowledge about its respective jurisdictions. The 
fire service collects data relating to the buildings, geography, and critical infrastructure in 
its response districts. With additional training, it is feasible to advance the data collection 
capability and include preliminary disaster planning in the firefighter’s scope of work. 
The jurisdictional model creates an environment to mature a collective system.  
4. Request an Adjustment to the Region III Boundaries  
A further recommendation is to request that FEMA adjust the Region III 
boundaries to include the complete Philadelphia metropolitan region or create a similar 
structure like the FEMA Office of National Capital Region Coordination. The case 
studies provide support for the benefit of regional clusters. The regional fire service 
network is dependent upon a strong federal, state, and local government emergency 
management network. The existing structure divides the region in half, with three New 
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Jersey counties in FEMA Region II, and the five Pennsylvania counties in FEMA Region 
III. If the resulting network intends to support the collective needs of the region, then it 
must be all inclusive.  
5. Demonstrate Key Leadership Behaviors to Strengthen Regional Fire 
Service Networks 
Arlington County Fire Chief Jim Schwartz, the incident commander at the 
terrorist attack on the Pentagon on 9/11, provides insight for what is missing in our 
efforts to build robust regions. During a recent interview on the tenth anniversary of 9/11, 
Chief Schwartz commented that leadership is a key requirement for success in homeland 
security. In addition, Chief Schwartz emphasized the need to “form strong collaborative 
relationships across disciplines, and jurisdictions as the best method to build strong 
systems of interdependence” (Schwartz, 2011).  
Regional leaders need to embrace the necessity to create successful networks to 
strengthen all aspects of regional response. The first step for leaders is to signal their 
participation in the network; this will result in the organizations’ commitment to a first 
step. The Philadelphia metropolitan region has the benefit of many strong partners with 
engaged public service experience that can be involved in the network.  
6. The Regional Fire Service Network Needs to Adopt Features of 
Successful Regions 
Results matter in governmental operations, and the lack of progress in our ability 
to manage responses to terrorist events confirms the need to make significant mid-course 
corrections to the homeland security enterprise. Although the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) provides a management framework, the deployment system 
lacks a uniform network that makes the best use of regional fire service resources. The 
transformation needs to prepare the enterprise for full dimensional protection similar to 
the processes used in the military. Successful regional networks build knowledge and 
operational capability over time.  
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The Philadelphia metropolitan region needs to adopt the features of other regions 
that demonstrate successful response outcomes. To some degree, the regional participants 
need to present with an affinity or likeness that helps to facilitate the partnership. 
Understanding one’s limitations is important, and regional networks are necessary 
because what the participants gain together cannot be achieved individually. Planning is 
another essential feature and provides direction, focus, and clarity for the participants, 
helping to avoid mission creep. 
The features identified from the case studies include the processes, like 
collaboration, that help a regional network evolve. Meeting occasionally is not the same 
as active collaboration when the purpose is to achieve an end goal. One effective method 
to develop these relations is to undertake one manageable initiative initially in order to 
create a working relationship. Joint training and exercising is another practice that 
facilitates building participants’ cohesion within the network. Large-scale multi-
discipline exercises provide regional incident commanders and section chiefs with the 
opportunity to develop experience. Uniform standard operating procedures and the 
utilization of NIMS on everyday responses provide a disciplined response when large-
scale events occur. One goal for the region is to create a fully integrated common 
operating picture from the emergency scene to the highest decision levels, including 
local, state, and federal operations centers.  
One solution to the coordination problem involves the use of smooth handoffs and 
features that in turn improve performance and the building of a culture of ownership in 
the homeland security enterprise. Developing these two practices can help to provide an 
optimal outcome. An analogy by Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey emphasizes the 
potential gains from collaboration in public safety. 
Charles Ramsey’s anecdote, “The Relay Race”: 
In the 4-x-100 relay race, the outcome depends not only on how fast the 
individual contestants run, but also on the smooth handoff of the baton 
from one runner to the next. It is the same in our work place. Smooth 
handoffs get the best results. We are more likely to solve problems when 
we share information, coordinate activities, and involve everyone, 
smoothly and enthusiastically.  
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There is also another similarity. What if the runners were told to leave the 
stadium after they ran their individual leg of the race? “The outcome of 
the race is not your concern.” Ridiculous, right? Yet this is what we do 
when we forget to get people involved in the process. We forget that 
everyone needs to see the results of their actions. We forget that everyone 
needs to feel a sense of ownership and achievement.  
7. Discussion  
a. Reconstructing the Field 
Changing the fire service paradigm from a community-only view to a region-of-
communities view is necessary to achieve homeland security Thus, regional fire services 
must evolve by “reconstructing the field from new fundamentals” (Kuhn, 1996). 
Christopher Bellavita, Ph.D, Director Academic Programs, Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security, wrote in February 2011:  
Existing paradigms (represented in this discussion by traditional public 
safety disciplines) continue unchallenged as long as they satisfactorily 
address the problems they face. “Paradigm testing occurs only after 
persistent failure to solve a noteworthy puzzle has given rise to a crisis.” 
(Bellavita, 2011, p. 4) 
Failure to make the required changes to our first-responder system 
continues the premise that we are prepared and secure when, in fact, the fire service 
knows that the system has not evolved as promised. If another attack like 9/11  or another 
disaster like Katrina occurs, the public reaction to a flawed public-safety response could 
contain the momentum to push the federal government to expand the role of the National 
Guard in order to provide the degree of response required. Unfortunately, existing fire 
services continue to be underutilized, and they must remain so since their local 
communities require their presence. In place of maximizing taxpayer-funded resources, 
we risk the creation of another layer of expensive protection for high-risk, low-frequency 
incidents.  
 49 
Bellavita (2011) used Thomas Kuhn’s research on scientific revolutions to 
provoke thinking about the homeland security perspective and the best means to retool 
current public-safety resources. Kuhn asserts that, in order for us to effect a change in the 
current paradigm that we accepted post–September 11, 2001, we must simultaneously 
accept a new paradigm. “The decision to accept another and the judgment leading to that 
decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature, and with each other.” 
The process requires a “reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a 
reconstruction that changes some of the field’s most elementary theoretical 
generalizations”; thus, “when the transition is complete, the profession will have changed 
its view of the field, its methods, and its goals” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 85).  
In its role as a CBRNE response element, the fire service has already 
adopted a new set of fundamentals. The next step in the process is to identify the overlap 
between the old and the new paradigms. The path forward includes the development of a 
new system of relating that maximizes fire service capacity in regional networks.  
Recent iterations of homeland security policies provide support for the 
creation of a regional fire service network model. The NPG affirms that targets outlined 
in the Preparedness Goal are ambitious and “will require a national effort involving the 
whole community” (DHS, 2011b). The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
recognized and dedicated an entire chapter to the concept of maturing and strengthening 
the homeland security enterprise. Specifically, the QHSR promotes the building of 
capable communities, regional response capacity, the creation of unity of effort, the 
institutionalization of homeland security planning, and the fostering of a broad national 
culture of cooperation and mutual aid.  
The recession that began in 2008 continues to encourage a reengineering 
of government enterprises, and this momentum can help to facilitate the acceptance of a 
new network for public-safety response to homeland security incidents. As local 
government resources continue to decline, the focus on core functions has reemerged in 
many jurisdictions. In addition, these same budget constraints have renewed interest in 
shared service arrangements between jurisdictions. Further, governments realize that 
these are permanent budget reductions, not cyclical, as they have seen in prior years.  
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b. Planning in Regional Networks  
The Metropolitan Planning Organization is an example of regional 
coordination that uses an interdependent system among federal, state, and local 
governments. The federal government recognized the value of regional planning and 
coordination when it mandated metropolitan planning organizations (MPO) in 1962 to 
carryout transportation projects and programs. The federal government adopted this 
process to ensure that all federally funded transportation projects use the same process, 
known as the “3 Cs”: continuing, cooperative, and comprehensive planning process. 
Congress identified several key reasons that MPOs are essential: (a) transportation 
investment means allocating scarce federal and other transportation funding resources 
appropriately, (b) planning needs to reflect the region’s shared vision for its future, (c) 
adequate transportation planning requires a comprehensive examination of the region’s 
future and investment alternatives, and (d) an MPO is needed to facilitate collaboration of 
governments, interested parties, and residents in the planning process (United States 
Department of Transportation, 2011). 
The homeland security enterprise faces ongoing criticism of its planning 
process and therefore the results of those weak processes. The metropolitan planning 
organization (MPO) model used for regional transportation infrastructure projects 
provides a proven framework for FEMA regional jurisdictions to consider in their quest 
to evolve. The Federal Highway Administration coordinates critical multi-state, regional 
policy and infrastructure programs using this process, which provides input from 
stakeholders and elected officials to drive transportation and community policy. The 
structural process is worthy of further study for its application to the homeland security 
enterprise.  
c. The Potential for Future Research Efforts and Federal 
Investment in Homeland Security Training  
The investment in employee professional development is sizable and 
ongoing, from the time a recruit graduates basic training up to, and including his last year 
of employment. Currently the homeland security enterprise has no method to evaluate 
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and contrast these investments from a fiscal perspective. In addition, the sophistication of 
homeland security training has advanced beyond in-service training on new equipment 
and drilling on plans to demonstrate proficiency. The new field of homeland security at 
the higher echelons is more in step with the type of development provided to today’s 
professional soldiers.  
In an effort to continue the development of the homeland security 
discipline, it is important to identify and assess the true costs associated with these 
investments. Additional research more specific to the creation of a regional fire service 
network model includes the assessment of the need for a staff and command program 
centered on the next generation of public safety leaders developed to work specifically in 
the new domain.  
The military provides one example of a discipline that recycles its 
knowledge base after personnel retire from active service, essentially multiplying the 
investment of formal training and experience. The notable feature is that the knowledge 
base remains within the service sector, creating further benefit. How can the homeland 
security enterprise make use of the same concepts adapted from the military?  
8. Conclusion  
The DHS doctrine intended to strengthen coordination among local, federal, and 
state responders falls woefully short of its objective and unwisely places the full 
responsibility onto disparate local government mayors, emergency managers, fire chiefs, 
and police chiefs. The most recent national preparedness directive, Presidential Policy 
Directive (PPD-8) National Preparedness requires the development of a national 
preparedness goal by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Specifically, and related to the 
thesis, PPD-8 requires “an integrated, layered, and all-of-Nation preparedness approach 
that optimizes the use of available resources.” (White House, 2011). Creating a regional 
fire service network provides a mechanism to use existing resources efficiently and 
advances its knowledge and capability.  
The loosely structured homeland security enterprise is not capable of achieving 
the mission in its current form, as we observe during actual emergency incidents and 
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through independent assessments. The solutions proffered provide a practical, low-cost, 
high-return reengineering of U.S. fire services to serve the homeland security enterprise.  
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